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COULD DISTRIBUTED LEDGER SHARES LEAD TO 
AN INCREASE IN STOCKHOLDER-APPROVED 
MERGERS AND SUBSEQUENTLY AN INCREASE 
IN EXERCISE OF APPRAISAL RIGHTS? 
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ABSTRACT 
Blockchain, the distributed ledger technology underlying 
cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, is poised to revolutionize industries 
and processes across disciplines. In particular, government agen-
cies and companies are looking for ways to leverage blockchain’s 
efficiencies to facilitate safe record-keeping. Municipalities are em-
ploying blockchain-issued deeds to accurately record property own-
ership. Progressive legal professionals are employing blockchain-
issued “smart-contracts” to more accurately record contract terms. 
Intellectual property attorneys and related government agencies 
are researching blockchain-issued copyrights and patents. 
This Note examines how utilizing blockchain technology in 
securities trading to maintain accurate stockholder ledgers will 
allow for current market forces to be reflected in stockholder voting. 
Further, this Note seeks to address how blockchain-issued shares 
of stock could affect stockholder approved mergers and the exercise 
of appraisal rights. This Note posits that accurate stockholder ledg-
ers will lead to an increase in stockholder approved mergers, but 
will not have an effect on the exercise of appraisal rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto created a database of distrib-
uted ledgers leveraging peer-to-peer technology that now operates 
the popular cryptocurrency, Bitcoin.1 In the decade since Naka-
moto’s use of distributed ledgers for cryptocurrency, legal scholars 
have researched the implications of blockchain technology in the 
finance, securities, and copyright industries.2 “Blockchain technol-
ogy”, as used in this Note, refers to a “distributed ... ledger that, 
when combined with a digital transaction validation process, allows 
for the peer-to-peer electronic transfer of an asset without the 
need for an intermediary.”3 
This Note seeks to explore how blockchain technology can 
revolutionize stock trading, focusing on the use of Distributed 
Ledger Shares (“DLS”) to increase the accuracy of a corporation’s 
stock ledger. Specifically, this Note concentrates on the effects of 
stock ledger accuracy on stockholder-voted mergers and appraisal 
right assertion. Part I provides a brief overview of blockchain 
technology generally. Part II explores corporate record-keeping 
requirements. Specifically, it explains how the advantages of block-
chain technology can be leveraged to greatly reduce inaccuracies 
in corporation’s stock ledgers. Part III details the tangible ad-
vantages of blockchain technology and outlines how Delaware plans 
to capitalize on these efficiencies in stock trading. Next, Part IV 
introduces the governing state and federal law for obtaining stock-
holder approval for mergers and other corporation reorganiza-
tions, as well as dissenting stockholder appraisal rights. Further, 
Part IV argues that increased accuracy in stockholder lists could 
have an effect on increasing the rate of merger approvals. Final-
ly, this Note suggests that implementation of DLS would not 
have an effect on the number of stockholders who exercise their 
appraisal rights. 
                                                                                                            
1 Scott J. Shackelford & Steve Meyers, Block-by-Block: Leveraging the 
Power of Blockchain Technology to Build Trust and Promote Cyber Peace, 19 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 334, 338 (2017). 
2 Id. at 337. 
3 Alan Cohn, Travis West & Chelsea Parker, Smart After All: Blockchain, 
Smart Contracts, Parametric Insurance, And Smart Energy Grids, 1 GEO. L. 
TECH. REV. 273, 277 (2017). 
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The magnitude of the issue of inaccurate stockholder ledgers 
was illuminated in a recent Delaware case involving the assertion 
of 49,164,415 facially valid settlement claims of a class of common 
stockholders in Dole Food Company (Dole), when only 36,793,758 
shares of common stock were on record in the class.4 In re Dole 
involved a single-step merger in which the common stockholders 
of Dole received $13.50 per share as consideration.5 The consid-
eration was distributed to the stockholders of record on the De-
pository Trust Company’s (DTC’s) centralized ledger.6 DTC’s ledger 
consists of the record owner of shares, not the beneficial own-
ers.7 Consideration for the Dole merger was thus distributed to 
the record holders listed on the centralized ledger, not the bene-
ficial owners.8 
A class of Dole common stockholders filed suit against Dole’s 
fiduciaries and ultimately settled for $2.74 per share, plus inter-
est.9 The court initially ordered that the settlement be allocated 
through traditional claims methods, involving a settlement admin-
istrator who mails notices and claims to potential class members.10 
When A.B. Data, the Settlement Administrator, received roughly 
thirty-three percent more share claims than the class of calcu-
lated common stock actually held, the discrepancy was irreconcila-
ble.11 Ultimately, the court granted the class counsel’s motion to 
modify the allocation procedure to authorize settlement distribution 
                                                                                                            
4 In re Dole Food Co. Stockholder Litig., No. 8703-VCL, 2017 WL 624843, 
at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2017). Some of these claims were rendered “facially valid” 
because claimants provided documentation of receipt of the merger considera-
tion. Id. at *2. This is not an accurate validating document, however, because 
those who received merger consideration were on the record November 1, 
whereas, those who should have received merger consideration and this set-
tlement were beneficial owners on November 4, the date of closing. Id. at *3. 
5 Id. at *1. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at *5. This means that during an initial public offering, shares are is-
sued to DTC. Id. Then, DTC sells those shares to brokers and other interme-
diaries who subsequently sell the beneficial ownership rights of the shares to 
individuals. Id. at *6. Beneficial ownership rights include the right to vote and 
the right to receive dividends. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a) (2011). DTC only records 
the record owners from the first transaction on its centralized ledger, not the 
later resale and trades of stock. In re Dole Food Co., 2017 WL 624843, at *3. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at *1. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
2019] DISTRIBUTED LEDGER SHARES 785 
to be effectuated in the same manner as merger consideration 
was distributed.12 The record owners were expected to distribute 
both the consideration and the settlement amounts to the correct 
beneficial owners.13 The problem in this case arose because these 
record owners did not maintain accurate track of the identity of 
the beneficial owners and therefore were unable to distribute both 
the consideration and the settlement amount to the correct ben-
eficial owners.14 
The court noted that the scale of the inconsistency between 
the class of common stockholders and those asserting their rights as 
common stockholders (an approximately 13 million share discrep-
ancy) is largely a product of the depository system.15 In this case, 
DTC put a “chill” on the records of Dole at close of business on 
November 1, 2013.16 The deal closed on November 4 and consider-
ation was distributed then.17 But, in the three-day period between 
“chilling” the records and closing, more than thirty-two million 
shares of Dole common stock were traded, with no record on DTC’s 
centralized ledger.18 The centralized ledger did not reflect the trades 
in the days preceding closing.19 Therefore, both the record own-
ers of shares on November 1, when DTC stopped tracking trading, 
and the beneficial owners of shares on November 4, when the mer-
ger was effectuated, asserted their facially valid claims as mem-
bers of the common stockholder class on the date of the merger.20 
Under the current system, obtaining accurate records of beneficial 
ownership is “not realistically achievable” because it would require 
information from hundreds of brokers, banks, and their clients.21 
Judge Laster posited that “distributed ledger technology offers a 
potential technological solution (to the depository system) by 
maintaining multiple, current copies of a single and comprehen-
sive stock ownership ledger.”22 
                                                                                                            
12 Id. 
13 Id. at *3. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at *4 n.1. 
16 Id. at *3. A “chill” locks in the stockholder’s position on the ledger. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at *3. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at *4. 
22 Id. at *4 n.1. 
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The problem of inaccurate tracking of stockholders extends 
beyond affecting the settlement claim rights discussed in Dole. 
The issue also impacts stockholder votes on mergers and, relatedly, 
appraisal rights because they both involve stockholders asserting 
ownership rights to vote, and be compensated for, their dissent-
ing opinion.23 If stockholder ownership is not accurately recorded, 
stockholders can lose the opportunity to effectively exercise their 
statutorily guaranteed rights.24 
Although Delaware law only requires corporations to main-
tain a list of record holders (not beneficial owners), blockchain 
technology could offer a solution to tracking both types of owner-
ship.25 Without the need for intermediaries to trade securities, 
individuals will be free to trade both the record and beneficial 
ownership easily.26 Distributed ledger trading can facilitate track-
ing of both record and beneficial ownership through peer-to-peer 
transactions, all while maintaining multiple, current copies of a 
single and comprehensive ledger.27 
I. BLOCKCHAIN GENERALLY 
Distributed ledgers utilize blockchain technology to facilitate 
a secure, transparent, and immutable transaction in real-time.28 
                                                                                                            
23 Joshua Klayman, Geoffrey Peck & Mark Wojciechowski, Why the Dela-
ware Blockchain Initiative Matters to All Dealmakers, FORBES (Sept. 20, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2017/09/20/why-the-delaware-block 
chain-initiative-matters-to-all-dealmakers/2/#6072ebc05f77 [http://perma.cc/FP 
A6-668R]; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (West 2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 262(a) (West 2018). 
24 See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d 20, 59 (Del. Ch. 2016); In re 
Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2015 WL 4313206, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 30, 
2015) (both holding that beneficial owners can forfeit their appraisal rights 
due to complexities in the depository securities trading system). 
25 In re Dole Food Co., 2017 WL 624843, at *5; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 8-
207(a) (West 2018) (issuers should “treat the registered owner as the person 
exclusively entitled to vote, receive notifications, and otherwise exercise all the 
rights and powers of an owner”). 
26 See Reggie O’Shields, Smart Contracts: Legal Agreements for the Block-
chain, 21 N.C. BANKING INST. 177, 181 (2017); infra Section III.A. 
27 See In re Dole Food Co., 2017 WL 624843, at *4 n.1.; O’Shields, supra 
note 26, at 181. 
28 Harold Primm, Developments in Banking and Financial Law: 2016: VII. 
Regulating the Blockchain Revolution: A Financial Industry Transformation, 
36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 75, 80 (2016). 
2019] DISTRIBUTED LEDGER SHARES 787 
Blockchain technology uses distributed ledgers to employ a de-
centralized database, which is replicated on each computer in 
the network.29 Each member of the network maintains a ledger 
detailing the transaction history amongst the parties within the 
network.30 Every time a new transaction occurs, a new “block” is 
added to the existing chain of transaction history.31 Because of 
the decentralized feature of the database, this new “block” will 
be recorded on all ledgers within the database.32 
Transaction security is achieved through sophisticated cryp-
tography, which ensures that one party in the database cannot 
unilaterally alter the transaction history on a ledger.33 Further, 
each ledger on the distributed database must reconcile with a ma-
jority of other ledgers before completing a transaction, making 
fraudulent transactions nearly impossible.34 
The successive “blocks” which create a chain bolster 
transparency because blockchains provide a complete transac-
tion history.35 Immutability is achieved through the validation 
process; requiring a consensus among a majority of ledgers with-
in a database to legitimize a transaction.36 This instantaneous 
transaction validation is then recorded in real-time on each 
ledger, adding a new “block” to the chain.37 
II.  BLOCKCHAIN & CORPORATE RECORD-KEEPING 
Delaware corporate law confers beneficial ownership rights, 
including voting rights, dividend rights, and the standing to sue 
                                                                                                            
29 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7061(E)(1) (2017). 
30 Andrea Pinna & Wiebe Ruttenberg, Distributed Ledger Technologies in 
Securities Post-Trading: Revolution or evolution? 9, 17 (European Cent. Bank, 
Occasional Paper No. 172, 2016), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops 
/ecbop172.en.pdf [http://perma.cc/SB9V-TG9J]. 
31 Primm, supra note 28, at 78. 
32 Pinna & Ruttenberg, supra note 30, at 9, 17. 
33 Daniel DeConinck, Overstock Completes First Public Stock Issuance Using 
Blockchain, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 416, 427 (2017). 
34 Id.; M. Mark Heekin, A National Mortgage Notes Registry: America’s Im-
mense Need for Transparency and Certainty in Mortgage Ownership and the 
Right to Foreclose, 17 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 67, 107–08 (2017). 
35 DeConinck, supra note 33, at 427; Primm, supra note 28, at 78. 
36 Pinna & Ruttenberg, supra note 30, at 6, 12. 
37 Id.; see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7061(E)(1) (2017). For an explanation 
on the technological inner workings of blockchain, see generally O’Shields, 
supra note 26, at 180. 
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for breach of fiduciary duties to the direct, beneficial owners of 
shares.38 Voting rights are particularly important because, by vot-
ing, stockholders are afforded the opportunity to voice their in-
dividual opinions on corporate matters.39 But, under traditional 
share trading methods, it is extremely difficult to track the true 
beneficial owner of a share because of the multitude of interme-
diaries involved.40 
When a public company conducts an Initial Public Offering 
(IPO) to issue shares, a nominee of the Depository Trust Com-
pany (DTC) buys up most or all of the issued shares.41 Then, the 
DTC sells the shares to institutional investors at a higher rate.42 
Individuals or other security intermediaries then may buy the 
shares from the institutional investors and later sell the stock 
downstream on stock exchanges.43 Each time a share is “sold,” 
the security entitlements to beneficial ownership are actually 
assigned to the new buyer from the intermediary seller.44 The DTC 
remains the record owner of the stock, and only records broker 
ownership. When brokers and intermediaries sell shares, they do 
not track the true beneficial owners.45 Instead, they track the as-
signed ownership rights on an aggregate basis, which inaccu-
rately reflects the real individual owners.46 The inaccuracies of 
                                                                                                            
38 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a) (2011); Andrea Tinianow & Caitlin Long, Dela-
ware Blockchain Initiative: Transforming the Foundational Infrastructure of 
Corporate Finance, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. 
(Mar. 16, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/16/delaware-block 
chain-initiative-transforming-the-foundational-infrastructure-of-corporate-fi 
nance/ [http://perma.cc/RR2B-A6RP]. 
39 Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the 
Curious Turn Towards Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2082 (2010) 
(detailing rights of stockholders to elect boards of directors, vote on mergers 
and sale of substantially all of a corporation’s assets, vote to amend charter, 
and add proposals to proxy ballots). 
40 Stephen Fox, Recent Cases Demonstrate Need for Blockchain, HARV. L. 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 8, 2017), https://corpgov.law 
.harvard.edu/2017/08/08/recent-cases-demonstrate-need-for-blockchain/ [http:// 
perma.cc/S3RC-379U]; Tinianow & Long, supra note 38. 
41 Klayman et al., supra note 23. 
42 Id. 
43 Tinianow & Long, supra note 38. 
44 Fox, supra note 40; id. at 38. 
45 Tinianow & Long, supra note 38. 
46 Id. 
2019] DISTRIBUTED LEDGER SHARES 789 
tracking true beneficial owners are compounded by multiple levels 
of intermediary intervention in the trading of a single share.47 
This “depository system” can abridge important stockholder privi-
leges, like voting and appraisal rights, due to the compounded 
tracking inaccuracies.48 
A. Corporate Record-Keeping Requirements 
The problem of inaccurate records is significant because of 
the statutory record-keeping requirements in each state.49 Cor-
porations are required to maintain records of: articles of incorpo-
ration, amendments filed with the state, corporate bylaws, annual 
reports, names and addresses of directors and officers, names and 
addresses of stockholders, and meeting minutes.50 
In Delaware, corporations are required to maintain a com-
plete list (called a stock ledger)51 of stockholders entitled to vote, 
in alphabetical order, including the address of each stockholder 
and the number of shares registered to him.52 In addition, corpo-
rations must record transfers of stock in accordance with other 
                                                                                                            
47 Id. A recent Delaware case highlights the magnitude of the inaccurate 
tracking problem. In re Dole Food Co., Stockholder Litig., No. 8703-VCL 2015 
WL 5052214, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2015). For an in-depth discussion of 
Dole and the stockholder tracking issue, see Klayman et al., supra note 23. 
48 In re Dole Food Co. Stockholders Litig., 2017 WL 624843, at *4 n.1 (citing 
In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d 20, 59 (Del. Ch. 2016)); In re Appraisal of 
Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2015 WL 4313206, at *3–7 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2015) 
(holding that beneficial owners forfeit their appraisal rights due to the depos-
itory system). 
49 Nellie Akalp, How to Keep Proper Corporate Records, ENTREPRENEUR 
.COM (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/287676# [http:// 
perma.cc/3UDG-XUSF]. This Note will focus on Delaware Law, as more than 50 
percent of all publicly traded companies chose to incorporate in the state. JEFFERY 
W. BULLOCK, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT OF DELAWARE DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS, 
2 (2013), https://corpfiles.delaware.gov/Corporations_2013%20 Annual%20Report 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WU7-F9HF]. 
50 Id. 
51 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219(c) (West 2017) (“‘[S]tock ledger’ means one 
or more records administered by or on behalf of the corporation in which the 
names of all of the corporation’s stockholders of record, the address and num-
ber of shares registered in the name of each such stockholder, and all issu-
ances and transfers of stock of the corporation are recorded.”).  
52 Id. § 219(a). 
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securities laws.53 Accurate stock ledgers are significant because 
they facilitate ownership, voting, appraisal, and dividend rights 
of stockholders.54 
B. Increased Accuracy Using Blockchain 
The Delaware Blockchain Initiative (DBI) advocated for the 
amendment to Delaware Corporate Law to permit DLS in an effort 
to solve the problem of inaccurate record-keeping, specifically the 
inaccurate tracking of stockholders.55 DLS allow for precise track-
ing of share ownership because of the transaction-history recording 
function of each “block” added to a blockchain.56 The Delaware 
Court of Chancery has even pointed to distributed ledger technology 
as a solution to the inaccurate stock ownership tracking problem.57 
When an IPO is conducted using DLS, the Delaware Divi-
sion of Corporations can cryptographically sign and transfer the 
authorized share to the corporation.58 These original shares would 
serve as the first “blocks” on the corporation’s stock ledger block-
chain.59 Then, any subsequent transfers of shares are validated 
by a consensus of a majority of the network’s participants.60 Once 
validated, the transfer will be recorded as a new “block” and added 
to the transaction history for that share.61 This process allows 
for direct share ownership and a perfect record of those stock-
holders, in a format easily accessible to the corporation.62 Because 
of the finite number of authorized shares, a perfect record of 
those issued, and an accurate transaction history, DLS could solve 
the problem of inaccurate stockholder lists.63 
                                                                                                            
53 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 160 (West 2018); see DEL. CODE. ANN tit. 8 § 106 
(governing the transfer of investment securities). 
54 Klayman et al., supra note 23. 
55 Tinianow & Long, supra note 38. 
56 Pinna & Ruttenberg, supra note 30, at 3, 6–7. 
57 In re Dole Food Co. Stockholder Litig., No. 8703-VCL, 2017 WL 624843, 
at *4 n.1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2017) (“Distributed ledger technology offers a poten-
tial technological solution by maintaining multiple, current copies of a single and 
comprehensive stock ownership ledger.”). 
58 See Tinianow & Long, supra note 38. 
59 See Heekin, supra note 34, at 107–08. 
60 See Pinna & Ruttenberg, supra note 30, at 7.  
61 See Heekin, supra note 34, at 107–08. 
62 See Fox, supra note 40; Tinianow & Long, supra note 38. 
63 See Fox, supra note 40; S.B. 69, 149th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2017). 
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III. BLOCKCHAIN & STOCK TRADING 
Blockchain technology can improve securities trading effi-
ciencies by enabling a distributed ledger platform for secure, 
transparent, and immutable trading transactions.64 For exam-
ple, without the need for intermediaries to verify the validity of 
a transaction with an unknown buyer or seller, trading can be 
effectuated peer-to-peer instantaneously.65 By using blockchain 
technology, a securities trader can be sure that the transaction 
is both valid and unchangeable, due to the immutability charac-
teristic of distributed ledgers.66 In addition, the transparency 
provided by multiple ledgers tracking every transaction facili-
tates more trust in the security being traded, and less need for 
asset verification.67 An individual can more efficiently buy or sell 
securities using blockchain with the full confidence that the trans-
action is valid and unchangeable, without the use of an interme-
diary, thus decreasing transaction time and costs.68 
A. Delaware’s Implementation of Blockchain Technology 
Delaware was the first state to announce its support for 
implementation of distributed ledger technology in securities 
trading.69 Formed in May 2016, the DBI supported an amend-
ment to Delaware Corporate Law to accommodate distributed 
ledger offerings and trading of shares.70 In July 2017, Delaware 
amended its Corporate Law to permit the use of blockchain 
technology to create and maintain corporate records, including 
                                                                                                            
64 See DeConinck, supra note 33, at 426. 
65 See supra Part I. 
66 See Pinna & Ruttenberg, supra note 30, at 10–11. 
67 See Heekin, supra note 34, at 107–08. 
68 See infra Section III.A. 
69 Marco A. Santori, Governor Jack Markell Announces Delaware Block-
chain Initiative, GLOBAL DEL. BLOG (June 10, 2016), https://global.delaware 
.gov/2016/06/10/delaware-to-create-distributed-ledger-based-share-ownership 
-structure-as-part-of-blockchain-initiative/ [https://perma.cc/BRG9-4YFU]. 
70 Meri Weiss, Delaware Moves Toward Blockchain Technology, HARV. BUS. 
SERV. BLOG (June 19, 2017), https://www.delawareinc.com/blog/Delaware-moves 
-toward-blockchain-technology/ [https://perma.cc/ABB3-HGVH].  
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distributed ledger shares (DLS).71 These DLS are recorded and 
transferred on a decentralized ledger.72 
Corporations opting to incorporate using DLS can benefit 
from the core efficiencies of blockchain technology by eliminat-
ing unnecessary intermediaries in the securities market and 
accurately tracking share ownership.73 DLS can leverage the 
two main innovations of blockchain technology: accurate track-
ing of transfers of property and direct property ownership trans-
fers from peer-to-peer.74 
Although Delaware is the first state to use blockchain 
technology for securities trading, other states have begun efforts 
to leverage blockchain efficiencies for other purposes.75 Congress 
                                                                                                            
71 S.B. 69, 149th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2017). This act is intended to provide 
specific statutory authority for Delaware corporations to use networks of electronic 
databases for the creation and maintenance of corporate records, including 
the corporation’s stock ledger; “[the stock ledger] must enable a corporation to 
prepare the list of stockholders specified in Sections 219 and 220 ... and, as 
required by Section 159, it must record transfers of stock as governed by Article 
8 of Subtitle I of Title 6.” Delaware Senate Bill 69 Summary, LEGISCAN, 
https://legiscan.com/DE/bill/SB69/2017 [https://perma.cc/6PR8-MZV4]. 
72 See Weiss, supra note 70. 
73 See Fox, supra note 40; Ryan Surujnath, Note, Off the Chain! A Guide to 
Blockchain Derivatives Markets and the Implications on Systemic Risk, 22 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 257, 260 (2017) (“[A]t their core, blockchains are 
about trust and transparency among unknown peers in the absence of mutu-
ally agreed upon intermediaries.”); Tinianow & Long, supra note 38. 
74 See O’Shields, supra note 26, at 181. 
75 Jeffrey Neuburger, Arizona Passes Groundbreaking Blockchain and 
Smart Contract Law—State Blockchain Laws on the Rise, NEW MEDIA & 
TECH. L. BLOG (Apr. 20, 2017), https://newmedialaw.proskauer.com/2017/04 
/20/arizona-passes-groundbreaking-blockchain-and-smart-contract-law-state-block 
chain-laws-on-the-rise/ [https://perma.cc/4D39-6MUB]; see, e.g., H.B. 2417, 53rd 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2017) (clarifying the enforceability of “smart contracts” 
and electronic signatures executed utilizing blockchain technology); H.B. 1481, 
29th Leg. (Haw. 2017) (establishing a “working group” to advise on the use of 
blockchain technology in identity and access management, healthcare, legal 
services, financial services, manufacturing, and tourism); Legis. Doc. 950, 128th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 2017) (using blockchain technology in conjunction with paper 
ballots in elections); S.B. 398 79th (Nev. 2017) (“recognizing blockchain tech-
nology as a type of electronic record for the purposes of the Uniform Electronic 
Transactions Act”); H.868, 88th Gen. Assemb. (Vt. 2016) (stating that under 
the Vermont Rules of Evidence, blockchain-based records will be considered 
“business records”); Illinois Department of Innovation & Technology, Illinois 
Blockchain Initiative (created to explore innovations presented by Blockchain 
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has even employed the Congressional Blockchain Caucus to explore 
how blockchain can “improve identity management, asset track-
ing and ownership, healthcare records management, intellectual 
property rights, and much more.”76 While federal law regulates 
securities trading, state law governs corporations pursuant to 
the internal affairs doctrine.77 Accordingly, individual states will 
have to amend their corporate legislation to allow for blockchain-
enabled corporate record-keeping of stock ledgers.78 
IV. ACCURATE STOCKHOLDER LISTS & MERGER APPROVALS 
At common law, mergers and other business combinations 
required a unanimous stockholder vote to approve the transaction.79 
Through the evolution of state corporate law, statutory mergers 
today can be effectuated with less than unanimous stockholder 
approval.80 Under Delaware law, two or more corporations may 
merge into a single surviving corporation, by way of a proper mer-
ger agreement.81 First, the Boards of Directors of each company 
                                                                                                            
and distributed ledger technology), https://illinoisblockchain.tech/ [https://perma 
.cc/J3BV-HSUT]. 
76 Congressmen Jared Polis & David Schweikert, Congressional Blockchain 
Caucus, https://www.congressionalblockchaincaucus.com/ [https://perma.cc/AQ 
P6-EAR7]. 
77 Timothy P. Glynn, Communities and Their Corporations: Toward a Stake-
holder Conception of the Production of Corporate Law, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
1067, 1075, 1078 (2008) (defining the internal affairs doctrine as “a horizontal 
choice-of-law rule that provides that the law of the state of incorporation governs 
the relationship between the firm, its shareholders, and firm management.”). 
78 See Akalp, supra note 49 (noting that states vary in their record-keeping 
requirements). 
79 Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 (1941) (“At com-
mon law, unanimous shareholder consent was a prerequisite to fundamental 
changes in the corporation”). 
80 For a historical overview of the development of stockholder voting rights 
on corporate combinations, see generally Nelson Ferebee Taylor, Evolution of 
Corporate Combination Law: Policy Issues and Constitutional Questions, 76 
N.C. L. REV. 687, 695 (1998). 
81 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(a) (West 2017). Note that not all statutory 
mergers must be submitted to stockholder vote. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 251(f)–(h) (West 2017) (proscribing the situations in which a Board of Directors 
is not required to present the merger agreement to stockholder for approval). For 
the purposes of this Note, “merger” refers to those business reorganizations 
which require stockholder approval pursuant to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 
(West 2017).  
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must adopt a resolution approving such agreement, which states 
the material terms and effects of such a merger.82 Then, the 
agreement must be submitted to the stockholders of both corpo-
rations at an annual or special meeting.83 It is significant to note 
that notice of the time, place, and purpose of the meeting is sent 
to those stockholders on the company’s stock ledger at least twenty 
days before the meeting.84 The merger is approved if, at the meet-
ing to consider the agreement, a majority of stockholders of out-
standing stock in the corporation who are entitled to vote, vote 
in favor of the merger.85 
In addition to the right to vote on certain mergers, stock-
holders are also entitled to appraisal rights.86 Appraisal rights 
are extended to those stockholders who: own shares on the date of 
the vote, own the shares through the effective date of the business 
reorganization, and did not vote in favor of the merger.87 Because 
of the depository system, the record holder of shares who is rec-
orded in the official stockholder list is usually not the beneficial 
owner of the shares, entitled to dissenters’ appraisal rights.88 The 
record owner of shares, DTS, will vote in bulk on the merger for 
all of their recorded shares.89 DTS does not differentiate between 
the individual stockholders votes because the shares are held in 
“fungible bulk” among many others.90 This creates a problem 
because in order to exercise appraisal rights, a stockholder must 
                                                                                                            
82 Id. § 251(b). All resolutions should state the terms and conditions of the 
merger, how the merger will be carried out, and what consideration will be 
paid to the constituent stockholders. Id. § 251(b)(1)–(2), (5)–(6). For mergers, 
resolutions must also state amendments to the certificate of incorporation. Id. 
§ 251(b)(3). For consolidations, resolutions must include the certificate of 
incorporation of the resulting corporation. Id. § 251(b)(4). 
83 Id. § 251(c). 
84 Id. 
85 Id.; see Celia R. Taylor, “A Delicate Interplay”: Resolving the Contract 
and Corporate Law Tension in Mergers, 74 TUL. L. REV. 561, 577 (1999) (“Fi-
nal shareholder approval concludes the approval stage and the mechanics of 
the merger will then be implemented.”). 
86 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (West 2018).  
87 Id. 
88 Robert S. Reder & Stanley Onyeador, Delaware Chancery Disqualifies 
Lead Petitioners in Dell Appraisal Who Inadvertently Voted “FOR” Manage-
ment Buyout, 69 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 279, 286 (2016). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
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have voted against a merger.91 If the record holder votes shares in 
bulk without determining which shares are for or against the 
merger, a stockholder can forfeit their appraisal rights by “inad-
vertently voting in favor of the merger due to complexities created 
by the depository system.”92 
Under a new regime of blockchain facilitated peer-to-peer 
stock trading, the issue of inaccurate stockholder votes on mergers 
and inadvertent forfeiture of appraisal rights can be remedied.93 
Stockholder votes are taken in real-time, by the true beneficial own-
ers of stock.94 Approving stockholders can be sure that their vote is 
counted, and dissenting stockholders will have accurate proof that 
they voted against the reorganization.95 The effects of this timely, 
more accurate system of stockholder voting could increase the rate 
of merger approvals and make it easier to assert appraisal rights. 
Current Delaware law requires that a merger agreement 
be submitted to stockholders at least twenty days prior to the date 
of the meeting to approve the merger.96 However, due to the high 
volume of stock trading that occurs between announcement of a 
merger, stockholder vote, and subsequently, the closing of the deal, 
the stockholders who receive the agreement twenty days prior to 
voting are not the same beneficial owners of the target stock twenty 
days later.97 Because DLS allow for accurate tracking of beneficial 
stockholders, those who acquire shares during the twenty-day 
                                                                                                            
91 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (West 2018). 
92 In re Dole Food Co. Stockholder Litig., No. 8703-VCL, 2017 WL 624843, 
at *11 n.1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2017); see In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d 
20, 59 (Del. Ch. 2016) (holding that the complexities created by the depository 
system can force beneficial owners to forfeit appraisal rights). 
93 In re Dole Food Co., 2017 WL 624843, at *11 n.1. 
94 See DeConinck, supra note 33, at 426–27; Primm, supra note 28, at 78–80. 
95 See Reade Ryan & Mayme Donohue, Securities on Blockchain, 73 BUS. 
LAWYER 85, 97–98 (2018) (explaining how securities traded on distributed 
ledgers maintain a record of definitive ownership). If the definitive owners vote, 
their voting record will be accurately recorded as well. Id. at 94, 100.  
96 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (West 2017).  
97 See In re Dole Food Co. Stockholder Litig., 2017 WL 624843, at *3 (thirty-two 
million shares traded in the three days before closing of the merger); Isfandiyar 
Shaheen, Stock Market Reaction to Acquisition Announcements Using an Event 
Study Approach, FRANKLIN & MARSHALL C. DEP’T ECON. (May 5, 2006) (“An-
nouncements of mergers and acquisitions immediately impact a target com-
pany’s stock price, as induced reaction in the stock market cause investors to 
revise expectations about the company’s future profitability.”). 
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pre-vote period should also be given the merger agreement.98 In 
addition, on the day of the vote, the true beneficial owners of the 
shares will be able to express their opinion for or against the 
merger agreement.99 
This scenario, where the true post-announcement, pre-
closing beneficial owners of shares vote for a merger, will result 
in the heightened probability that a merger is approved. Essen-
tially, the market forces100 after a merger is announced that influ-
ence the voting behavior of stockholders are now reflected on an 
accurate stockholder ledger.101 As discussed in-depth below, the 
general market force is from stockholders who bought shares after 
the merger announcement and support the consummation of that 
merger.102 DLS allow these market forces to determine the out-
come of the actual vote because the corporation will have access to 
an accurate stockholder list on the day of the vote.103 This increased 
approval rating can be explained by evaluating the three types 
of voting stockholders whose ownership has been accurately tracked 
in real time.104 The accurate stockholder list, coupled with the up-
dated transaction history of shares, allows for the market forces 
to have a real effect on stockholder voting.105 
This Section will evaluate the expected voting behaviors 
of three types of stockholders: those who owned target stock before 
the merger announcement and plan to continue being stockholders 
(“X stockholders”), those who bought target stock after the merger 
announcement (“Y stockholders”), and those who owned target stock 
                                                                                                            
98 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (West 2017). 
99 See id.; supra Part IV. 
100 “Market forces,” as referenced in this Note, refer to the trading behav-
iors of institutional investors who are interested enough to make informed trading 
decisions. Jeffrey Manns & Rover Anderson IV, The Merger Agreement Myth, 
98 CORNELL L. REV. 1143, 1155 (2013). This Note does not predict the trading 
behaviors of disinterested individual investors, who may be rationally apathetic. 
Market forces in this Note further assume that DLS use a private blockchain 
in which the stockholders cannot see the trades or votes of other stockholders. 
101 See Ryan & Donohue, supra note 95, at 98 (explaining how securities 
issued on a blockchain ledger give issuer almost real-time data as to the accurate 
record holders of its securities). 
102 See infra Section IV.D. 
103 See Ryan & Donohue, supra note 95, at 98. 
104 See id. at 98. 
105 See id.; see also Fox, supra note 40. 
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before the merger announcement but do not plan on remaining 
as stockholders (“Z stockholders”). This Note presumes the efficient 
market hypothesis in predicting security trading behaviors.106 “Eco-
nomic theory broadly assumes that the semi-strong efficient market 
hypothesis applies to stock prices. This well-established frame-
work asserts that stock prices immediately incorporate all publicly 
available information about the issuer which implies that the in-
formation ... is incorporated into the stock price on the trading day 
of the disclosure.”107 The expected voting behaviors of X, Y, and Z 
stockholders rely on this semi-strong version of the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis, meaning that their trading behaviors are based on in-
corporating the information of a merger announcement.108 
A. X Stockholders 
X stockholders were owners of the target company stock 
prior to the merger announcement. The acquiring company offers a 
premium in either cash or stock to be traded for the target stock-
holders’ shares.109 In response to a merger announcement, the 
demand for target company shares increases, causing the stock 
to trade at a premium on the market.110 Because X stockholders 
have chosen to forgo the premium they could realize by selling on 
the market, they are indicating a belief that the merger consid-
eration is more valuable than the market premium offered.111 It 
follows that these X stockholders will vote in favor of the merger 
because they want to realize the benefits of forgoing the market 
premium and actually receive the merger consideration.112  
                                                                                                            
106 Efficient Market Hypothesis is especially relevant in the merger context 
because institutional investors, “specialize in investing in merger target companies 
and rapidly acquire ... target company shares after the merger announcement.” 
Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1155. 
107 Id. at 1147 n.8. 
108 See id. at 1155. 
109 See Shaheen, supra note 97, at 3–4, 27. 
110 See Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1154. 
111 See id. at 1160, 1170 (explaining that merger announcements have a 
strong positive impact on target company share price, usually up to a price just 
below the consideration to be paid in the merger). 
112 See id. at 1147 (“Markets understand that the decision to merge appears 
driven by the hope ... for greater potential returns for the combined company 
and the target company’s shareholders’ desire for the takeover premium.”). 
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Another group of X stockholders (X’), may have forgone sell-
ing on the market because they believe that the value of the target 
company’s stock without merging will be greater than both the 
premium offered on the market and the merger consideration.113 
Therefore, such group of X stockholders may vote against the mer-
ger to realize the highest value from their stock.114 However, due 
to the influence of the Y stockholders explained below, it would 
be irrational to be an X’ stockholder because the merger will most 
likely be approved and such X’ stockholder would receive the con-
sideration that such stockholder has already deemed insufficient.115 
Because of this reality, stockholders with an X’ mentality will either 
become normal X stockholders who vote in favor of the merger and 
receive consideration, Z’ stockholders who plan to vote against the 
merger and subsequently assert appraisal rights, or sell on the 
market, losing the effect of their vote entirely.116 
In summary, X stockholders are owners of the target com-
pany stock before the merger announcement.117 Due to their belief 
that the merger consideration is superior to the premium market 
price, they have foregone selling their shares.118 To receive the con-
sideration, the merger must be approved and therefore, X stock-
holders will vote in favor of the merger.119 
B. Y Stockholders 
Y stockholders bought the target company stock after the 
merger announcement. As discussed, in response to merger an-
nouncements, target stock demand increases and so does the 
market price.120 Y stockholders paid a premium on the market 
                                                                                                            
113 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 43 (3d ed. 
2012) (explaining a valid reason to want a merger is that the sum of the whole is 
worth more than the individual parts). X’ stockholders take the opposite view, 
believing that the value of the individual company is worth more.  
114 See, e.g., id. 
115 See infra Sections IV.A–C. 
116 See In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d 20, 59 (Del. Ch. 2016).  
117 See Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1154. 
118 This belief is supported by the trend of target company share prices ris-
ing to a level just below the offered consideration to be paid in the merger. 
See id. at 1160. 
119 See id. at 1147 (explaining the target stockholder’s desire for the takeover 
premium offered as consideration). 
120 See id. 
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for the target company stock, indicating that they think the mer-
ger consideration is more valuable than even the premium price 
they paid for the stock itself.121 Because the Y stockholders chose 
to become equity owners of the target company after the merger 
is announced, they were necessarily called to action by the mer-
ger prospect itself.122 To gain value over the premium price paid, 
these Y stockholders will vote in favor of the merger to receive 
the consideration.123 
There may be some stockholders (Y’) who bought target com-
pany stock after the merger announcement but who do not want 
the merger to be effectuated, signifying a belief that target stock 
will be worth more if the target stays independent.124 Y’ stock-
holders may take the merger announcement as an indicator that 
target stock is undervalued, and be willing to pay a premium to 
realize a portion of that value, with the opportunity for it to increase 
more.125 However, to capture the arbitrage spread, the merger 
needs to be effectuated so the stockholder can be liquidated or given 
more valuable stock as consideration.126 This means that a rational 
Y’ stockholder will either sell to another eager Y stockholder 
who wants to benefit from the merger consideration, or they will 
                                                                                                            
121 See id. at 1155 (discussing the acquisition of target shares post-merger 
announcement by hedge funds and institutional investors who specialize in 
investing in target companies seeking to exploit arbitrage opportunity). 
122 See id. at 1147. 
123 See id. 
124 Otherwise, Y’ stockholders would not have bought the target stock at 
such a market premium without the intent to receive the takeover premium 
consideration. Compare BAINBRIDGE, supra note 113, at 46 (“[t]he successful 
bidder typically pays a premium of 30–50 [percent] ... over the pre-bid market 
price of the target’s stock.”), with Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1160, 
1170 (explaining that merger announcements have a strong positive impact on 
target company share price, usually up to a price just below the consideration 
to be paid in the merger). Z’ stockholders would be willing to pay this market 
premium and forego the takeover premium. See Manns & Anderson, supra 
note 100, at 1172–73.  
125 But see id. at 1147 (explaining that the decision to merge is motivated 
by an expectation of future potential returns of the combined company, not 
the target individually). 
126 See Shaheen, supra note 97, at 6. An arbitrage spread is the difference 
between the consideration and the current market price. Investors seeking to 
capture the spread must buy the target stock at a discount to the consideration 
offered, and then liquidate those shares after the merger is effectuated. Id. 
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vote in favor of the merger themselves, effectively acting as reg-
ular Y stockholders.127 
In summary, Y stockholders bought target company stock 
for a premium on the market after the merger is announced.128 
Like X stockholders, Y stockholders believe that the merger con-
sideration is superior to the premium market price.129 To receive 
that superior consideration, the merger must be approved and 
therefore Y stockholders will vote in favor of the merger.130 
C.  Z Stockholders 
Z stockholders owned target stock before the merger an-
nouncement, but do not want to continue as target stockholders. 
Instead of selling their shares on the market for a premium, Z 
stockholders hold onto their shares. This retention of shares 
indicates a belief that either the merger consideration is worth 
more than the premium market price, the value of the target stock 
will be worth more than both the consideration and the market 
premium if the company stays independent, or that the fair 
market value of the stock will be worth more than the both the 
consideration and the market premium.131 The latter group, Z’ 
stockholders, plan to assert appraisal rights and receive the fair 
market value. 
                                                                                                            
127 See Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1147 (expressing stockholder 
desire for takeover premiums); Shaheen, supra note 97, at 6 (discussing cap-
turing the arbitrage spread). 
128 See Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1147. 
129 See id.; supra Section IV.B. 
130 See Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1147 (explaining the target 
stockholder’s desire for the takeover premium offered as consideration). 
131 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 113, at 46 (“[T]he successful bidder typically 
pays a premium of 30–50 [percent] ... over the pre-bid market price of the 
target’s stock.”); Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1170 (explaining that 
merger announcements have a strong positive impact on target company share 
price, usually up to a price just below the consideration to be paid in the merger); 
David A. Katz, Shareholder Activism in the M&A Context, HARV. L. SCH. F. 
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 27, 2014), https://corpgov.law.har 
vard.edu/2014/03/27/shareholder-activism-in-the-ma-context/ [https://perma.cc 
/YMR5-9L72] (discussing the high success rate of obtaining a higher price than 
merger consideration in appraisal litigation in Delaware in the past). 
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Z stockholders who believe that the merger consideration 
is worth more than the premium market price are effectively X 
stockholders and will vote in favor of the merger.132 
Z stockholders who believe that the value of the target stock 
is worth more than the premium market price and the considera-
tion if the company stays independent, will vote against the merger 
to realize such value.133 Z stockholders will have to effectively eval-
uate the probability of the merger being denied in order to ra-
tionally decide to vote against the merger in hopes of higher realized 
value as a stockholder of the independent target company.134 If 
the Z stockholder concludes that the merger will not be effectu-
ated, the decision to remain a target stockholder and vote against 
the merger is justified.135 However, the risk of retaining the tar-
get company shares and losing out on the market premium is high, 
because if the merger is approved, the Z stockholder will be left 
to either accept the consideration or become a Z’ stockholder attempt-
ing to assert appraisal rights.136  
These outcomes completely depend on the voting behavior 
of the other stockholders.137 As discussed in the previous sections, 
a majority of X and Y stockholders will vote in favor of the merger 
to realize the value they pursued originally.138 In light of the mass 
quantity of market activity surrounding the announcement of a 
merger, Z stockholders should be cautious due to the flux of Y 
                                                                                                            
132 See Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1160; supra Section IV.A. 
133 Otherwise, if they vote in favor of the merger, they will receive the con-
sideration which Z stockholders have determined doesn’t maximize their stock-
holder value. This belief is contrary to the usual behavior of target stockholders 
who desire a takeover premium paid as consideration. See Manns & Anderson, 
supra note 100, at 1147. 
134 See id. (explaining the target stockholder’s desire for the takeover pre-
mium offered as consideration). 
135 If the merger is not effectuated, then target stockholders will not receive 
the consideration, which is inadequate anyways according to Z stockholder 
calculations. See id.  
136 But see Katz, supra note 131 (discussing the high success rate of obtaining 
a higher price than merger consideration in appraisal litigation in Delaware 
in the past). 
137 See Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1147 (assuming the semi-
strong Efficient Market Hypothesis). 
138 See supra Sections IV.A–C. 
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stockholders entering the voting pool.139 The X and Y affirmative 
voting pool will most likely outnumber the Z group of stockholders, 
because any rational target stockholder owning shares on the day 
of the merger will vote in favor of it.140 Therefore, Z stockholders 
who vote against the merger will be left to take the consideration 
or assert appraisal rights, neither outcome being ideal for their 
calculation of maximization of value.141 Z stockholders who do not 
want to become Z’ stockholders asserting appraisal rights, will be 
forced to accept the merger consideration. If they are going to 
accept the consideration, they are now effectively X stockholders 
who will vote in favor of the merger.142 
Z stockholders who believe that the fair market value of 
target stock will be worth more than the consideration and the 
market premium, Z’ stockholders, will vote against the merger 
to realize this value.143 Stockholders are entitled to assert ap-
praisal rights if they vote against the merger.144 The rational Z’ 
stockholder must believe that the time and effort necessary to 
assert appraisal rights will yield more value than receiving the 
consideration from the merger.145 Z’ stockholders have already 
foregone realizing a gain from the market premium by not sell-
ing on the market before the merger is consummated.146 Appraisal 
litigation is risky and can be very expensive.147 Therefore, the 
                                                                                                            
139 See, e.g., In re Dole Food Co. Stockholders Litig., No. 8703-VCL, 2017 
WL 624843, at *8 (explaining that thirty-two million shares were traded in 
the three days before closing of the merger). 
140 Assuming rational stockholder action under the Efficient Market Hypothe-
sis in the merger context. See Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1155. 
141 See id. at 1147 (expressing stockholder desire for takeover premiums); 
Shaheen, supra note 97 (discussing capturing the arbitrage spread). 
142 See Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1160. 
143 Fair market value as determined by a court in appraisal right perfection 
litigation. Katz, supra note 131 (discussing the high success rate of obtaining 
a higher price than merger consideration in appraisal litigation in Delaware 
in the past). 
144 See supra Part IV; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (West 2018). 
145 See Katz, supra note 131. 
146 See Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1147 (discussing target 
stockholder desire for the takeover premium reflected in the rising price of target 
shares after a merger is announced). 
147 See Katz, supra note 131 (discussing the high success rate of obtaining a 
higher price than merger consideration in appraisal litigation in Delaware in 
the past).  
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pool of Z’ dissenting voters will be small, as most target stock-
holders will be looking for a guaranteed realization of value.148 
In summary, Z and Z’ stockholders owned target stock before 
the merger announcement and wish to remain target stockholders 
after the merger vote. The only way to remain stockholders of an 
independent target company is to vote against the merger.149 
However, due to the high probability that large numbers of X 
and Y stockholders will vote in favor of the merger, and the low 
probability that the fair market value awarded by a court realiz-
es an actual gain, Z stockholders will also be incentivized to vote 
in favor of the merger to receive the guaranteed consideration.150 
D. Merger Approval 
The ability of a target company to accurately track the 
beneficial ownership of its shares will undoubtedly lead to more 
precise voting by the true owners of stock, as reflected on a pre-
cise stock ledger.151 This accuracy allows market forces that 
drive stockholder activity surrounding the announcement of a mer-
ger to become evident in the actual stockholder vote.152 To sum-
marize, on the day of the vote, target stockholders are either 
pre-announcement stockholders, who have not sold their shares, 
or post-announcement share acquirers, who paid a premium to 
                                                                                                            
148 See id. It is unclear whether high success rates were due to suits being 
brought in only the most egregious of circumstances or whether courts are sympa-
thetic to the dissenting stockholder asserting appraisal rights in general. Id. 
In either case, it is still prohibitively expensive to initiate and prevail in appraisal 
right perfection litigation. Id. 
149 Otherwise, “if a quorum is present, the merger will be approved if more 
votes are cast in favor of the plan of merger than against it.” BAINBRIDGE, supra 
note 113, at 160. 
150 See Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1147 (expressing stockholder 
desire for takeover premiums); Shaheen, supra note 97, at 6 (discussing cap-
turing the arbitrage spread). 
151 See In re Dole Food Co. Stockholder Litig., No. 8703-VCL, 2017 WL 
624843, at *4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2017); Ryan & Donohue, supra note 95, at 
100 (explaining how securities traded on distributed ledgers maintain a rec-
ord of definitive ownership).  
152 See In re Dole Food Co. Stockholder Litig., 2017 WL 624843, at *11 n.1 
(explaining that thirty-two million shares were traded in the three days before 
closing of the merger); Ryan & Donohue, supra note 95, at 98. 
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become stockholders.153 Because the majority of rational actors in 
both of those groups will be motivated to vote in favor of the 
merger, more stockholder-approved mergers will be effectuated 
using DLS.154 
E. Exercise of Appraisal Rights 
The problem enumerated in Dole extends to the loss of 
appraisal rights for some stockholders due to inaccurate track-
ing of beneficial owners who voted against a merger.155 However, 
by using DLS and therefore having an accurate stockholder ledger, 
companies will be able to track which of the true beneficial owners 
vote in favor or against the merger.156 In theory, this accurate 
tracking of beneficial owner votes will make it easier to perfect 
appraisal rights, as one of the required elements is proof of vot-
ing against the merger.157 But, practically this will not increase 
the exercise of appraisal rights because of the market forces 
discussed in the previous Section.158  
On voting day, the rational stockholder will vote in favor 
of the merger to receive the consideration.159 Z’ stockholders are 
the only group which may vote against the merger to receive “fair 
market value” through the appraisal process.160 But, as discussed, 
it would be extremely risky to count on the time and expense of 
appraisal litigation to be outweighed by such a large “fair mar-
ket value” premium as to make the perfection of appraisal rights 
worth it.161 Accordingly, appraisal rights litigation probably will 
                                                                                                            
153 See Manns & Anderson, supra note 100, at 1147. 
154 See supra Sections IV.A–C. 
155 See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d 20, 59 (Del. Ch. 2015); In re 
Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2015 WL 4313206, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 13, 
2015) both holding that beneficial owners can forfeit their appraisal rights 
due to complexities in the depository securities trading system). 
156 See Ryan & Donohue, supra note 95, at 100 (explaining how securities 
traded on distributed ledgers maintain a record of definitive ownership). If 
the definitive owners vote, their voting record will be accurately recorded as 
well. See id. at 94. 
157 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (West 2018); Reder & Onyeador, supra 
note 88, at 286. 
158 See supra Part IV. 
159 See Katz, supra note 131. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
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not increase from historical levels as a consequence of accurate 
stockholder ledgers.162 
CONCLUSION 
Blockchain technology has the potential to revolutionize the 
securities trading world through DLS. One potential result of 
leveraging blockchain for DLS is that corporations would be able 
to maintain an up-to-date, accurate stockholder ledger at all times. 
Further, this means that when corporations submit proxies to 
stockholders to vote on, the true beneficial owners of the shares 
will receive these proxies and their votes will be counted.163 This 
innovation of accurate stockholder lists is significant to stock-
holder approved mergers because, in using DLS, the true owners 
of shares will vote for or against the proposed transaction.164 This 
Note posits that the market forces already in play surrounding 
the announcement of a merger can be reflected in the vote using 
accurate stockholder lists that are current up to the date of the 
vote. Because these market forces can be reflected in the vote using 
DLS, more stockholder approved mergers will be effectuated.165 
In addition, increased accuracy of stockholder lists will not cause 
an increase in the perfection of appraisal rights due to the pro-
hibitive costs of such litigation.166 
                                                                                                            
162 Id. 
163 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (West 2018); see Ryan & Donohue, supra 
note 95, at 97.  
164 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (West 2018); see Ryan & Donohue, supra 
note 95, at 97. 
165 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 262(a) (West 2018); Katz, supra note 131. 
166 See In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 143 A.3d 20, 59 (Del. Ch. 2015); Katz, 
supra note 131. 
 
